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Sexuality and the “System of Liberty”:
Comment on Stolzenberg

WILLIAM A. GALSTON*

I begin my commentary on Stolzenberg=s beautifully crafted paper
with the question of this conference: What is the state’s interest in
marriage? As phrased, this question is underspecified. There is no
reason to believe that different kinds of states will have the same interest
in marriage. (Recall the conceptions of marriage and family in Plato’s
Republic or, if you prefer a real-world example, the kibbutzim of the
mid-twentieth century.) So let us rephrase the question before us: What
is the interest of the liberal democratic state in marriage?
The traditional answer begins by noting that liberal democracy is a
system of “ordered liberty,” standing between anarchy and oppression.1
Libertarian critics see liberal democracy as an infringement on true
liberty, while traditionalist critics see it as disordered. Similarly, marriage is
often understood as a form of ordered liberty, standing between sexual
license and asceticism. For advocates of sexual liberty, such as Philip
Roth’s protagonist, marriage is the negation of liberty, rightly understood.2
For those at the other extreme, such as Tolstoy’s protagonist, marriage is
a veneer of conventional respectability covering the reality of sexual
relations indistinguishable in principle from licentiousness.3
* Interim Dean, University of Maryland School of Public Policy; Saul I. Stern
Professor of Civic Engagement; Director, Institute for Philosophy and Public Policy.
1. See Viet D. Dinh, Assistant Attorney General, Harold Leventhal Talk, (June 7,
2002), http://www.usdoj.gov/olp/leventhaltalk.pdf (last visited Aug. 30, 2005). See also
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 324–25 (1937).
2. PHILIP ROTH, THE DYING ANIMAL (2001).
3. Leo Tolstoy, The Kreutzer Sonata, in THE DEATH OF IVAN ILYCH AND OTHER
STORIES (Signet Classic 2003) (1886).
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Let us inspect the critique of marriage from the standpoint of sexual
liberty, which for better or worse is more accessible to us than
asceticism. For Roth’s David Kepesh, philandering represents the ideal
of true liberty. As Kepesh sees it, says Stolzenberg, “sex is liberty
unmodified, . . . the only liberty worth its name. To indulge in sexual
promiscuity . . . is thus to be the true champion of liberty.”4 Conversely,
Kepesh contends, marriage, love, or indeed any form of attachment is a
form of emotional dependency that represents a surrender of freedom.
Although Stolzenberg does not put it quite this way, Kepesh may even
be said to deny the adequacy of our conference question: the state’s
interest in marriage may not coincide with the individual’s interest, and
in cases of conflict there is no compelling reason to prefer the interests
of the state. After all, doesn’t liberalism, rightly understood, mean that
the state is merely an instrument to the satisfaction of individual desire?
And why stop at consumerist desire when sexual desire is so much more
urgent, and fundamental?
For the purposes of this Comment, I will set aside the question whether
Kepeshian sexual liberty is an adequate depiction of male desire (for the
record, I think not). The more pertinent issue is the relation between his
stance and liberal democracy.
The liberal democratic project, from Milton and Locke to Mill and Rawls,
has always been to identify principled limits to the scope of personal
freedom. Four classic strategies have emerged. The first is the argument
made by advocates of the minimal state (and also in a way by Kant) that
to sustain social relations, a system of freedom requires mutual limitations
on individual liberty: We can determine the content of individual liberty
by asking whether a particular individual’s claim to freedom is consistent
with the like claims of other individuals.5 Second, liberals (Mill, for one)
have often argued that individual liberty is the space for unimpeded
action defined by the legitimate limits of public power.6 Third, there is a
tradition of liberal inquiry into the relation between the attributes of
individuals and the maintenance of liberal institutions.7 Tocquevillians
place this inquiry in the context of civil society, which for them includes

4. Nomi Maya Stolzenberg, Liberals and Libertines: The Marriage Question In the
Liberal Political Imagination, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 949 (2005).
5. See IMMANUEL KANT, METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE: PART I OF THE
METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 30 (John Ladd trans., 2d ed., Hackett Pub. Co. 1992).
6. The locus classicus of this position is JOHN STUART MILL, On Liberty, in THE
PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN STUART MILL: ETHICAL, POLITICAL AND RELIGIOUS (Marshall
Cohen ed., 1961) (1863).
7. See WILLIAM A. GALSTON, LIBERAL PURPOSES: GOODS, VIRTUES, AND
DIVERSITY IN THE LIBERAL STATE 213–17, 263–64 (1991).

976

GALSTON.DOC

[VOL. 42: 975, 2005]

10/12/2005 10:13 AM

Sexuality
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

the family;8 Madisonian liberals have their own version of the thesis that
the public good depends on private character.9
We now come to the fourth strategy, namely, limits on individual
conduct rooted in conceptions of personal development or perfection.
There are several variants. For those who believe that liberal democracy
rests on theological foundations, liberal individualism rightly understood
is a form of imitatio dei.10 There is as well a secular version of this
thesis—a liberal normative psychology of intellect or will as standing
above and limiting desire.11 Stolzenberg offers another variant, based on
the proposition that love and desire, rightly understood, point us away
from Kepesh’s view of emotional attachment as a trap and toward a
“theory of limits that can explain when and why the condition of
emotional dependency that attachments entail is consistent with the
value of freedom.”12 It is in a “theory of love,” she argues, that we find
the most satisfactory liberal account of restraints on individual conduct;
most satisfactory because it asks us to locate limits by affirming our
desires, once clarified through self-reflection, rather than denying them
outright.13
This is a classic (indeed, Platonic) move. Recall the ring of Gyges
story in the Republic: at first blush, it appears that if we could break all
rules of conduct with impunity, we would discard all restraint, sexual
and otherwise, and claim unfettered freedom for ourselves while denying
to others to the extent needed to gratify our desires.14 In short, we would
become tyrants. A standard response of moral philosophers is to insist
that such conduct is unfair or unjust. But this is a stance that Socrates
and his interlocutors cannot embrace. After all, why be just if it is
not to one=s personal advantage? The Platonic response is that properly
understood, unrestrained erotic desires turn out to be self-limiting: What
8. See Michael S. Joyce, Citizenship in the 21st Century: Individual Self-Government,
in BUILDING A COMMUNITY OF CITIZENS 3, 4–5 (Don E. Eberly ed., 1994).
9. See James Q. Wilson, The Rediscovery of Character: Private Virtue and
Public Policy, 81 PUB. INT. 3, 15–16 (1985).
10. See SOLOMON SCHECTER, ASPECTS OF RABBINIC THEOLOGY 199–202 (1961)
and Solomon Schechter, Imitatio Dei: To Be or Not to Be, http://www.jhom.
com/topics/envy/imitatio.html (last visited Aug. 23, 2005).
11. See ROGERS M. SMITH, LIBERALISM AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 30
(1985).
12. Stolzenberg, supra note 4, at 973.
13. Id.
14. See THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO 41–44 (John Llewelyn Davies & David James
Vaughan trans., London: MacMillan & Co. 1888).
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we really want is not tyrannical domination over others, but rather forms
of connection with them that enable us to glimpse, perhaps even
participate in, a higher good while sustaining orderly social relations and
a decent polity.
Stolzenberg=s proposal has the merit of linking liberal freedom to
psychological considerations far richer than the thin self-interest of homo
economicus, and also of connecting liberal thought to the themes of
literature and the philosophical tradition. It must be said, however, that
other accounts seem considerably closer to the real world of liberal
politics and more likely to pertain to the state=s specific interest in
marriage. For example, it is hard to see how the minimum conditions of
social order could be secured in circumstances of unrestrained sexual
competition. The alternative to “thou shalt not covet thy neighbor’s wife” is
not only sin but violence. It is also hard to see how a society could
sustain itself over time without effective ways of raising children. As
Stolzenberg herself observes, Kepesh walks away, not just from his wife,
but also from his son, who cannot forgive him and is thus psychologically
wounded and deformed.15 It is not moralism, but political prudence, to
invoke some version of Mill’s principle: In the pursuit of personal
gratification, I may be at liberty to harm myself, but I am not at liberty to
harm others.16 Kepesh wants to “turn freedom into a system,”17 a classic
liberal ideal. But he cannot do that by turning those around him into
casualities.
Stolzenberg’s effort to rest ordered sexual liberty on a theory of love
is bold, not the least because it exposes her to a high standard of
psychological realism. She must grapple with challenges such as the
riposte of Tolstoy’s protagonist: “‘To love one person for a whole lifetime
is like saying that one candle will burn a whole life.’”18 Rather than
suggesting that sexual limits and the fulfillment of desire coincide, it
seems more plausible to acknowledge that order always contains an
element of renunciation. You do not need to be a Freudian to believe
that there is no civilization without its attendant discontents. Indeed,
they are the price we pay for civilization, much as we pay taxes to
support public institutions. The ultimate test of any form of social
organization is whether its members can bear the sacrifices its survival
requires.

15.
16.
17.
18.
161.
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Stolzenberg, supra note 4, at 962.
See MILL, supra note 6, at 145, 156, 158.
Stolzenberg, supra note 4, at 962; PHILIP ROTH, supra note 2, at 64.
Stolzenberg, supra note 4, at 956, citing Leo Tolstoy, supra note 3, at 155,

